Does justification supervene on the internal?

Book chapter

Littlejohn, Clayton. (2024). Does justification supervene on the internal? In In Roeber, Blake, Sosa, Ernest, Steup, Matthias and Turri, John (Ed.). Contemporary debates in epistemology pp. 23-35 John Wiley & Sons, Inc..

Publication dates
Authors	Littlejohn, Clayton
Editors	Roeber, Blake, Sosa, Ernest, Steup, Matthias and Turri, John
Abstract	No abstract available.
Page range	23-35
Year	2024
Book title	Contemporary debates in epistemology
Publisher	John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Place of publication	Hoboken, New Jersey
Edition	Third edition
ISBN	9781119755449
Publisher's version	License All rights reserved File Access Level Controlled
Output status	Published
Print	2024
Publication process dates
Deposited	30 Jan 2025

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