Empirical ignorance as defeating moral intuitions? A puzzle for rule consequentialists (and others)

Journal article


Perl, Caleb. (2019). Empirical ignorance as defeating moral intuitions? A puzzle for rule consequentialists (and others). Analysis. 79(1), pp. 62-72. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/any003
AuthorsPerl, Caleb
Abstract

This paper develops an argument that, if rule consequentialism is true, it’s not possible to defend it as the outcome of reflective equilibrium. Ordinary agents like you and me are ignorant of too many empirical facts. Our ignorance is a defeater for our moral intuitions. Even worse, there aren’t enough undefeated intuitions left to defend rule consequentialism. The problem I’ll describe won’t be specific to rule consequentialists, but it will be especially sharp for them.

Year2019
JournalAnalysis
Journal citation79 (1), pp. 62-72
PublisherOxford University Press
ISSN0003-2638
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/any003
Scopus EID2-s2.0-85063479956
Research or scholarlyResearch
Page range62-72
Publisher's version
License
All rights reserved
File Access Level
Controlled
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online19 May 2018
Publication process dates
Deposited01 Sep 2021
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