Formulating moral error theory

Journal article

Perl, Caleb Herman. (2022). Formulating moral error theory. The Journal of Philosophy. 119(5), pp. 279-288. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2022119518
AuthorsPerl, Caleb Herman
Abstract

This paper shows how to formulate moral error theories given a contextualist semantics like the one that Angelika Kratzer pioneered, answering the concerns that Christine Tiefensee developed.

Keywordsphilosophy; moral error theory; moral judgements; morality; deontic semantics; philosophy of language; Angelika Kratzer; Christine Tiefensee
Year01 Jan 2022
JournalThe Journal of Philosophy
Journal citation119 (5), pp. 279-288
PublisherColumbia University Press
ISSN0022-362X
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2022119518
Web address (URL)https://www.pdcnet.org/jphil/content/jphil_2022_0119_0005_0279_0288
Open accessPublished as non-open access
Research or scholarlyResearch
Page range279-288
Publisher's version
License
All rights reserved
File Access Level
Controlled
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Print05 May 2022
Publication process dates
Deposited04 Jun 2024
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Place of publicationUnited States
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