Practical Political Liberalism

Book chapter


Perl, Caleb Herman. (2023). Practical Political Liberalism. In Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy: Volume 9 pp. 65-97 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198877639.003.0003
AuthorsPerl, Caleb Herman
Abstract

This chapter introduces a new version of political liberalism, or at least a new, very close cousin of political liberalism. The new version differs from traditional kinds of political liberalism in its focus on practical rather than doxastic commitments. One might be committed to paying taxes, and might also believe that paying taxes is morally required. The former is a practical commitment: a commitment to act. The latter is a doxastic state: belief in a proposition. This chapter focuses exclusively on the practical states necessary for cooperating together in the right way. So the author calls the new version practical political liberalism. The chapter introduces practical liberalism as particularly accommodating to religious citizens. For instance, it can seem like more traditional kinds of political liberalism require religious citizens to be skeptics about religious questions. Practical liberalism will explain why skepticism isn’t required. And the explanation illustrates more generally how practical liberalism doesn’t require religious citizens to accept additional commitments that they’d find objectionable. The chapter then argues that all political liberals should be practical liberals.

Keywordspolitical liberalism; reasonableness; tolerance; religion; skepticism
Page range65-97
Year01 Jan 2023
Book titleOxford Studies in Political Philosophy: Volume 9
PublisherOxford University Press
Place of publicationUnited Kingdom
Edition9
ISBN9780198877639
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198877639.003.0003
Web address (URL)https://academic.oup.com/book/45711/chapter/398149433
Open accessPublished as non-open access
Research or scholarlyResearch
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All rights reserved
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Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Print23 Mar 2023
Publication process dates
Deposited31 Jan 2024
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© the several contributors 2023

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