Shifty contextualism about epistemics

Journal article


Perl, Caleb. (2017). Shifty contextualism about epistemics. Ergo. 4(28), pp. 783-820. https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.028
AuthorsPerl, Caleb
Abstract

According to a highly natural, orthodox view, epistemic modals like might and must are contextually variable, allowing us to express different propositions in different contexts of utterance. This view (contextualism about epistemic modals) is the orthodox one because the only other ways of making sense of how epistemic expressions are sensitive to information (views like relativism, expressivism, and dynamicism) carry such unorthodox commitments. Yet it has faced more than its share of challenges. In this paper, I will argue that two important challenges for contextualism about epistemic modals receive the very same solution: one problem about disagreement, and one problem about the reasonableness of our epistemic beliefs. The first of these challenges is very familiar, and the second less so, but equally important.

Year2017
JournalErgo
Journal citation4 (28), pp. 783-820
PublisherUniversity of Michigan Press
ISSN2330-4014
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.028
Open accessPublished as ‘gold’ (paid) open access
Research or scholarlyResearch
Page range783-820
Publisher's version
License
File Access Level
Open
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online2017
Publication process dates
Deposited07 Sep 2021
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