Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
| Type | Department |
|---|---|
| Faculty | Faculty of Theology and Philosophy |
Latest research outputs
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Objectivism and subjectivism in epistemology
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). Objectivism and subjectivism in epistemology. In In Mitova, Veli (Ed.). The factive turn in epistemology pp. 142-160 Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316818992.009Book chapter
Knowledge, reason, and errors about error theory
Côté-Bouchard, Charles and Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). Knowledge, reason, and errors about error theory. In In Kyriacou, Christos and McKenna, Robin (Ed.). Metaepistemology : Realism and anti-realism pp. 147-171 Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6Book chapter
The right in the good : A defense of teleological non-consequentialism
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). The right in the good : A defense of teleological non-consequentialism. In In Ahlstrom-Vij, H. Kristoffer and Dunn, Jeffrey (Ed.). Epistemic consequentialism pp. 23-47 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779681.003.0002Book chapter
Standing in a garden of forking
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). Standing in a garden of forking. In In McCain, Kevin (Ed.). Believing in accordance with the evidence : New essays on evidentialism pp. 223-243 Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_13Book chapter
Evidence and its limits
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). Evidence and its limits. In In McHugh, Conor, Way, Jonathan and Whiting, Daniel (Ed.). Normativity : Epistemic and practical pp. 115-136 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198758709.003.0007Book chapter
Knowledge and normativity
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). Knowledge and normativity. In In Hetherington, Stephen and Valaris, Markos (Ed.). Knowledge in contemporary philosophy pp. 249-268 Bloomsbury Publishing. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781474258814.ch-013Book chapter
Moore’s Paradox and assertion
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). Moore’s Paradox and assertion. In In Goldberg, Sanford (Ed.). The Oxford handbook of Assertion pp. 707-725 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.12Book chapter
Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do
Dutant, Julien and Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do. Synthese. 195(9), pp. 3755-3772. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1220-zJournal article
Stop making sense? On a puzzle about rationality
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2018). Stop making sense? On a puzzle about rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 96(2), pp. 257-272. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12271Journal article
Loose talk, negation and commutativity : A hybrid dynamic-static theory
Carter, Sam. (2018). Loose talk, negation and commutativity : A hybrid dynamic-static theory. Sinn und Bedeutung 21. Edinburgh, Scotland, United Kingdom 04 - 06 Sep 2016 University of Konstanz. pp. 267-281Conference paper
Religious disagreement structure, content, and prospects for resolution
Audi, Robert. (2018). Religious disagreement structure, content, and prospects for resolution. Philosophia Christi. 20(1), pp. 277-288. https://doi.org/10.5840/pc201820126Journal article
On intellectualism in the theory of action
Audi, Robert. (2018). On intellectualism in the theory of action. Journal of the American Philosophical Association. 3(3), pp. 284-300. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2017.29Journal article
Who does wrong when an organisation does wrong?
Collins, Stephanie. (2018). Who does wrong when an organisation does wrong? In In Hess, Kendy, Igneski, Violetta and Isaacs, Tracy Lynn (Ed.). Collectivity : Ontology, ethics, and social justice pp. 197-220 Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc..Book chapter
Time, physics, and philosophy : It's all relative
Baron, Sam. (2018). Time, physics, and philosophy : It's all relative. Philosophy Compass. 13(1), pp. 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12466Journal article
A formal apology for metaphysics
Baron, Sam. (2018). A formal apology for metaphysics. Ergo. 5(39), pp. 1030-1060. https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.039Journal article
Infinite value and the best of all possible worlds
Climenhaga, Nevin. (2018). Infinite value and the best of all possible worlds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 97(2), pp. 367 - 392. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12383Journal article
Possible Patterns
Russell, Jeffrey Sanford and Hawthorne, John. (2018). Possible Patterns. In In K. Bennett and D. W. Zimmerman (Ed.). Oxford Studies in Metaphysics pp. 149 - 193 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198828198.003.0005Book chapter
Logical pluralism without the normativity
Blake-Turner, Christopher and Russell, Gillian. (2018). Logical pluralism without the normativity. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01939-3Journal article
Narrow content
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. (2018). Narrow content Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785965.001.0001Book
Quasi-expressivism about statements of law: A Hartian theory
Finlay, Stephen and Plunkett, David. (2018). Quasi-expressivism about statements of law: A Hartian theory. In In J. Gardner, L. Green and B. Leiter (Ed.). Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Volume 3 pp. 49 - 86 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198828174.003.0002Book chapter
Prudential and moral reasons
Crisp, Roger. (2018). Prudential and moral reasons. In In K. Bennett and D. Zimmerman (Ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity pp. 800 - 820 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.35Book chapter
Reflections on the Ideology of Reasons
Hawthorne, John and Magidor, Ofra. (2018). Reflections on the Ideology of Reasons. In In D. Star (Ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity pp. 113 - 142 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.6Book chapter
Ultra-liberal attitude reports
Blumberg, Kyle Hammett and Holguín, Ben. (2018). Ultra-liberal attitude reports. Philosophical Studies. 175(8), pp. 2043 - 2062. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0949-7Journal article
Fine-tuning Fine-tuning
Hawthorne, John and Isaacs, Yoaav. (2018). Fine-tuning Fine-tuning. In In M. A. Bentone, J. Hawthorne and D. Rabinowitz (Ed.). Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology pp. 136 - 168 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198798705.003.0008Book chapter
Intuitions are used as evidence in philosophy
Climenhaga, Nevin. (2018). Intuitions are used as evidence in philosophy. Mind: A Quarterly review of philosophy. 127(505), pp. 69 - 104. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw032Journal article
Narrow content and ur-content
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. (2018). Narrow content and ur-content. In Narrow Content pp. 72 - 105 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785965.003.0004Book chapter
Higher-Order contingentism, Part 2: Patterns of indistinguishability
Fritz, Peter. (2018). Higher-Order contingentism, Part 2: Patterns of indistinguishability. Journal of Philosophical Logic. 47(3), pp. 407 - 418. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-017-9432-3Journal article
No one can serve two epistemic masters
Gallow, J. Dmitri. (2018). No one can serve two epistemic masters. Philosophical Studies. 175(10), pp. 2389 - 2398. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0964-8Journal article
Quasi-internalism
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. (2018). Quasi-internalism. In Narrow Content pp. 158 - 175 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785965.003.0006Book chapter
Reasons and factive emotions
Dietz, Christina. (2018). Reasons and factive emotions. Philosophical Studies. 175(7), pp. 1681 - 1691. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0929-yJournal article
A stronger doctrine of double effect
Bronner, Ben and Goldstein, Simon. (2018). A stronger doctrine of double effect. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 96(4), pp. 793 - 805. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2017.1400572Journal article
Rationality and narrow content
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. (2018). Rationality and narrow content. In Narrow Content pp. 130 - 157 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785965.003.0005Book chapter
Can modalities save naive set theory?
Fritz, Peter, Lederman, Harvey, Liu, Tiankai and Scott, Dana. (2018). Can modalities save naive set theory? Review of Symbolic Logic. 11(1), pp. 21 - 47. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020317000168Journal article
Extended knowledge, the recognition heuristic, and epistemic injustice
Alfano, Mark and Skorburg, Joshua August. (2018). Extended knowledge, the recognition heuristic, and epistemic injustice. In In J. A. Carter, A. Clark and J. Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos and D. Pritchard (Ed.). Extended Epistemology pp. 239 - 265 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198769811.003.0014Book chapter
When does ‘Can’ imply ‘Ought’?
Collins, Stephanie. (2018). When does ‘Can’ imply ‘Ought’? International Journal of Philosophical Studies. 26(3), pp. 354 - 375. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2018.1489643Journal article
Higher-Order contingentism, Part 3: Expressive limitations
Fritz, Peter. (2018). Higher-Order contingentism, Part 3: Expressive limitations. Journal of Philosophical Logic. 47(4), pp. 649 - 671. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-017-9443-0Journal article
Do not revise Ockham's Razor without necessity
Baron, Sam and Tallant, Jonathan. (2018). Do not revise Ockham's Razor without necessity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 96(3), pp. 596 - 619. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12337Journal article
Moderate modal skepticism
Strohminger, Margot and Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani. (2018). Moderate modal skepticism. In In M. A. Benton, J. Hawthorne and D. Rabinowitz (Ed.). Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology pp. 302 - 321 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198798705.003.0016Book chapter
Truth-conditionality
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. (2018). Truth-conditionality. In Narrow Content pp. 63 - 97 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785965.003.0003Book chapter
‘The Government should be ashamed’: On the possibility of organisations’ emotional duties
Collins, Stephanie. (2018). ‘The Government should be ashamed’: On the possibility of organisations’ emotional duties. Political Studies. 66(4), pp. 813 - 829. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321717739553Journal article
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