A stronger doctrine of double effect

Journal article

Bronner, Ben and Goldstein, Simon 2018. A stronger doctrine of double effect. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 96 (4), pp. 793 - 805. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2017.1400572
AuthorsBronner, Ben and Goldstein, Simon

Many believe that intended harms are more difficult to justify than are harms that result as a foreseen side effect of one's conduct. We describe cases of harming in which the harm is not intended, yet the harmful act nevertheless runs afoul of the intuitive moral constraint that governs intended harms. We note that these cases provide new and improved counterexamples to the so-called Simple View, according to which intentionally phi-ing requires intending to phi. We then give a new theory of the moral relevance of intention. This theory yields the traditional constraint on intending harm as a special case, along with several stronger demands.

KeywordsDoctrine of Double Effect; disjunction; intention; permissibility; Simple View
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Journal citation96 (4), pp. 793 - 805
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2017.1400572
Scopus EID2-s2.0-85034589919
Page range793 - 805
Research GroupDianoia Institute of Philosophy
Place of publicationUnited Kingdom
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