The rationality of epistemic akrasia

[Extract] Even assuming that the guise issue can be controlled for, the thesis that all epistemically akratic states are irrational is subject to counterexamples. We shall, in part one below, present various families of counterexamples.4 Some proponents of anti-akrasia principles concede the existence of isolated counterexamples that they hope to circumscribe, thereby preserving the irrationality of epistemic akrasia in all but a certain special class of cases.5 Against this background, the point we want to make is that counterexamples are pervasive, and have various distinct sources. In part two, we look at two positive lines of argument for anti-akrasia principles. In part three, we look at a strategy for keeping the anti-akratic sensibility alive in the light of the examples presented in section one, a strategy that appeals to idealization. All told, the case against anti-akratic principles is surprisingly strong and the case for anti-akratic principles is surprisingly weak.