Knowledge from multiple experiences

Journal article

Goldstein, Simon and Hawthorne, John. (2022). Knowledge from multiple experiences. Philosophical Studies. 179(4), pp. 1341-1372. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01710-4
AuthorsGoldstein, Simon and Hawthorne, John
Abstract

This paper models knowledge in cases where an agent has multiple experiences over time. Using this model, we introduce a series of observations that undermine the pretheoretic idea that the evidential significance of experience depends on the extent to which that experience matches the world. On the basis of these observations, we model knowledge in terms of what is likely given the agent’s experience. An agent knows p when p is implied by her epistemic possibilities. A world is epistemically possible when its probability given the agent’s experiences is not significantly lower than the probability of the actual world given that experience.

Keywordsepistemology; knowledge; perception; probability
Year2022
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Journal citation179 (4), pp. 1341-1372
PublisherSpringer
ISSN0031-8116
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01710-4
Scopus EID2-s2.0-85112831330
Page range1341-1372
Publisher's version
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All rights reserved
File Access Level
Controlled
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online18 Aug 2021
Publication process dates
Accepted29 Jun 2021
Deposited22 Nov 2021
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