A preface paradox for intention
Goldstein, Simon. (2016). A preface paradox for intention. Philosophers' Imprint. 16(14), pp. 1-20.
In this paper I argue that there is a preface paradox for intention. The preface paradox for intention shows that intentions do not obey an agglomeration norm, requiring one to intend conjunctions of whatever else one intends. But what norms do intentions obey? I will argue that intentions come in degrees. These partial intentions are governed by the norms of the probability calculus. First, I will give a dispositional theory of partial intention, on which degrees of intention are the degrees to which one possesses the dispositions characteristic of full intention. I will use this dispositional theory to defend probabilism about intention. Next, I will offer a more general argument for probabilism about intention. To do so, I will generalize recent decision theoretic arguments for probabilism from the case of belief to the case of intention.
|Journal citation||16 (14), pp. 1-20|
|Web address (URL)||http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0016.014|
|Open access||Published as ‘gold’ (paid) open access|
File Access Level
|License: CC BY-NC-ND 3.0|
|File access level: Open|
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