AI deception : A survey of examples, risks, and potential solutions

Journal article

Park, Peter S., Goldstein, Simon, O'Gara, Aidan, Chen, Michael and Hendrycks, Dan. (2024). AI deception : A survey of examples, risks, and potential solutions. Patterns. 5(5), pp. 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patter.2024.100988
AuthorsPark, Peter S., Goldstein, Simon, O'Gara, Aidan, Chen, Michael and Hendrycks, Dan
Abstract

AI systems are already capable of deceiving humans. Deception is the systematic inducement of false beliefs in others to accomplish some outcome other than the truth. Large language models and other AI systems have already learned, from their training, the ability to deceive via techniques such as manipulation, sycophancy, and cheating the safety test. AI’s increasing capabilities at deception pose serious risks, ranging from short-term risks, such as fraud and election tampering, to long-term risks, such as losing control of AI systems. Proactive solutions are needed, such as regulatory frameworks to assess AI deception risks, laws requiring transparency about AI interactions, and further research into detecting and preventing AI deception. Proactively addressing the problem of AI deception is crucial to ensure that AI acts as a beneficial technology that augments rather than destabilizes human knowledge, discourse, and institutions.

Year01 Jan 2024
JournalPatterns
Journal citation5 (5), pp. 1-16
PublisherCell Press
ISSN2666-3899
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patter.2024.100988
Web address (URL)https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S266638992400103X?via%3Dihub
Open accessPublished as ‘gold’ (paid) open access
Research or scholarlyResearch
Page range1-16
Publisher's version
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Open
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online10 May 2024
Publication process dates
Deposited10 Oct 2024
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© 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.

This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

Supplementary material available at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S266638992400103X?...

Place of publicationUnited States
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