Getting accurate about knowledge

Journal article

Carter, Sam and Goldstein, Simon. (2023). Getting accurate about knowledge. Mind. 132(525), pp. 158-191.
AuthorsCarter, Sam and Goldstein, Simon

There is a large literature exploring how accuracy constrains rational degrees of belief. This paper turns to the unexplored question of how accuracy constrains knowledge. We begin by introducing a simple hypothesis: increases in the accuracy of an agent’s evidence never lead to decreases in what the agent knows. We explore various precise formulations of this principle, consider arguments in its favour, and explain how it interacts with different conceptions of evidence and accuracy. As we show, the principle has some noteworthy consequences for the wider theory of knowledge. First, it implies that an agent cannot be justified in believing a set of mutually inconsistent claims. Second, it implies the existence of a kind of epistemic blindspot: it is not possible to know that one’s evidence is misleading.

Journal citation132 (525), pp. 158-191
PublisherOxford University Press
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
Scopus EID2-s2.0-85167780737
Open accessPublished as ‘gold’ (paid) open access
Page range158-191
Publisher's version
File Access Level
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online14 Jun 2022
Publication process dates
Deposited12 Dec 2023
Permalink -

Download files

Publisher's version
License: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
File access level: Open

  • 40
    total views
  • 17
    total downloads
  • 2
    views this month
  • 2
    downloads this month
These values are for the period from 19th October 2020, when this repository was created.

Export as

Related outputs

A question-sensitive theory of intention
Beddor, Bob and Goldstein, Simon. (2023). A question-sensitive theory of intention. The Philosophical Quarterly. 73(2), pp. 346-378.
Conditional collapse
Carter, Samuel. (2023). Conditional collapse. Mind. 132(528), pp. 971-1004.
Language agents reduce the risk of existential catastrophe
Goldstein, Simon and Kirk-Giannini, Cameron Domenico. (2023). Language agents reduce the risk of existential catastrophe. AI & Society. pp. 1-11.
Attitude verbs’ local context
Blumberg, Kyle and Goldstein, Simon. (2023). Attitude verbs’ local context. Linguistics and Philosophy. 46(3), pp. 483-507.
Vagueness and discourse dynamics
Carter, Sam. (2022). Vagueness and discourse dynamics. In In Altshuler, Daniel (Ed.). Linguistics Meets Philosophy pp. 337 - 357 Cambridge University Press.
Fragile knowledge
Goldstein, Simon. (2022). Fragile knowledge. Mind. 131(522), pp. 487-515.
Goldstein, Simon and Kirk-Giannini, Cameron Domenico. (2022). Contextology. Philosophical Studies. 179(11), pp. 3187-3209.
Sly Pete in dynamic semantics
Goldstein, Simon David. (2022). Sly Pete in dynamic semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic. 51(5), pp. 1103-1117.
Knowledge from multiple experiences
Goldstein, Simon and Hawthorne, John. (2022). Knowledge from multiple experiences. Philosophical Studies. 179(4), pp. 1341-1372.
Counterfactual contamination
Goldstein, Simon and Hawthorne, John. (2022). Counterfactual contamination. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 100(2), pp. 262-278.
Degrees of assertability
Carter, Sam. (2022). Degrees of assertability. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 104(1), pp. 19-49.
Probability for epistemic modalities
Goldstein, Simon and Santorio, Paolo. (2021). Probability for epistemic modalities. Philosophers' Imprint. 21(33), pp. 1-37.
A suppositional theory of conditionals
Carter, Sam. (2021). A suppositional theory of conditionals. Mind. 130(520), pp. 1059-1086.
Mighty knowledge
Beddor, Bob and Goldstein, Simon. (2021). Mighty knowledge. Journal of Philosophy. 118(5), pp. 229-269.
The normality of error
Carter, Sam and Goldstein, Simon. (2021). The normality of error. Philosophical Studies. 178, pp. 2509-2533.
Losing confidence in luminosity
Goldstein, Simon and Waxman, Daniel. (2021). Losing confidence in luminosity. Noûs. 55(4), pp. 962-991.
Epistemic modal credence
Goldstein, Simon. (2021). Epistemic modal credence. Philosophers' Imprint. 21(26), pp. 1-24.
The counterfactual direct argument
Goldstein, Simon. (2020). The counterfactual direct argument. Linguistics and Philosophy. 43(2), pp. 193-232.
Free choice impossibilty results
Goldstein, Simon. (2020). Free choice impossibilty results. Journal of Philosophical Logic. 49(2), pp. 249-282.
Conditional heresies
Cariani, Fabrizio and Goldstein, Simon. (2020). Conditional heresies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 101(2), pp. 251-282.
Higher order ignorance inside the margins
Carter, Sam. (2019). Higher order ignorance inside the margins. Philosophical Studies. 176(7), pp. 1789-1806.
A theory of conditional assertion
Goldstein, Simon. (2019). A theory of conditional assertion. Journal of Philosophy. 116(6), pp. 293-318.
Generalized update semantics
Goldstein, Simon. (2019). Generalized update semantics. Mind: A Quarterly review of philosophy. 128(511), pp. 795-835.
Free choice and homogeneity
Goldstein, Simon. (2019). Free choice and homogeneity. Semantics and Pragmatics. 12, pp. 1-47.
Triviality results for probabilistic modals
Goldstein, Simon. (2019). Triviality results for probabilistic modals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 99(1), pp. 188-222.
Loose talk, negation and commutativity : A hybrid dynamic-static theory
Carter, Sam. (2018). Loose talk, negation and commutativity : A hybrid dynamic-static theory. Sinn und Bedeutung 21. Edinburgh, Scotland, United Kingdom 04 - 06 Sep 2016 University of Konstanz. pp. 267-281
A stronger doctrine of double effect
Bronner, Ben and Goldstein, Simon. (2018). A stronger doctrine of double effect. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 96(4), pp. 793 - 805.
Believing epistemic contradictions
Beddor, Bob and Goldstein, Simon. (2018). Believing epistemic contradictions. The Review of Symbolic Logic. 11(1), pp. 87-114.
'Now' with subordinate clauses
Carter, Sam and Altshuler, Daniel. (2017). 'Now' with subordinate clauses. 27th Semantics and Linguistic Theory Conference. University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, United States of America 12 - 14 May 2017 Department of Linguistics, Cornell University. pp. 358-376
Probability judgements about indicative conditionals : An erotetic theory
Carter, Sam. (2016). Probability judgements about indicative conditionals : An erotetic theory. Logic Journal of the IGPL. 24(4), pp. 600-611.
A preface paradox for intention
Goldstein, Simon. (2016). A preface paradox for intention. Philosophers' Imprint. 16(14), pp. 1-20.