Getting accurate about knowledge
Journal article
Carter, Sam and Goldstein, Simon. (2023). Getting accurate about knowledge. Mind. 132(525), pp. 158-191. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac009
Authors | Carter, Sam and Goldstein, Simon |
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Abstract | There is a large literature exploring how accuracy constrains rational degrees of belief. This paper turns to the unexplored question of how accuracy constrains knowledge. We begin by introducing a simple hypothesis: increases in the accuracy of an agent’s evidence never lead to decreases in what the agent knows. We explore various precise formulations of this principle, consider arguments in its favour, and explain how it interacts with different conceptions of evidence and accuracy. As we show, the principle has some noteworthy consequences for the wider theory of knowledge. First, it implies that an agent cannot be justified in believing a set of mutually inconsistent claims. Second, it implies the existence of a kind of epistemic blindspot: it is not possible to know that one’s evidence is misleading. |
Year | 2023 |
Journal | Mind |
Journal citation | 132 (525), pp. 158-191 |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
ISSN | 0026-4423 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac009 |
Scopus EID | 2-s2.0-85167780737 |
Open access | Published as ‘gold’ (paid) open access |
Page range | 158-191 |
Publisher's version | License File Access Level Open |
Output status | Published |
Publication dates | |
Online | 14 Jun 2022 |
Publication process dates | |
Deposited | 12 Dec 2023 |
https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/900qq/getting-accurate-about-knowledge
Download files
Publisher's version
OA_Carter_2023_Getting_accurate_about_knowledge.pdf | |
License: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 | |
File access level: Open |
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