Sly Pete in dynamic semantics

Journal article


Goldstein, Simon David. (2022). Sly Pete in dynamic semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic. 51(5), pp. 1103-1117. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-022-09660-w
AuthorsGoldstein, Simon David
Abstract

In ‘Sly Pete’ or ‘standoff’ cases, reasonable speakers accept incompatible conditionals, and communicate them successfully to a trusting hearer. This paper uses the framework of dynamic semantics to offer a new model of the conversational dynamics at play in standoffs, and to articulate several puzzles posed by such cases. The paper resolves these puzzles by embracing a dynamic semantics for conditionals, according to which indicative conditionals require that their antecedents are possible in their local context, and update this body of information by eliminating the possibilities where the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. In this way, the dynamic analysis draws on insights from the material conditional and contextualist analyses, while explaining how standoffs are genuine disagreements.

KeywordsSly pete; conditionals; dynamic semantics
Year2022
JournalJournal of Philosophical Logic
Journal citation51 (5), pp. 1103-1117
PublisherSpringer
ISSN0022-3611
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-022-09660-w
Scopus EID2-s2.0-85129285179
Open accessPublished as green open access
Page range1103-1117
Author's accepted manuscript
License
All rights reserved
File Access Level
Open
Publisher's version
License
All rights reserved
File Access Level
Controlled
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online03 May 2022
Publication process dates
Accepted24 Mar 2022
Deposited17 May 2023
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