Fragile knowledge

Journal article

Goldstein, Simon. (2022). Fragile knowledge. Mind. 131(522), pp. 487-515. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzab040

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Authors	Goldstein, Simon
Abstract	This paper explores the principle that knowledge is fragile, in that whenever S knows that S doesn’t know that S knows that p, S thereby fails to know p. Fragility is motivated by the infelicity of dubious assertions, utterances which assert p while acknowledging higher-order ignorance whether p. Fragility is interestingly weaker than KK, the principle that if S knows p, then S knows that S knows p. Existing theories of knowledge which deny KK by accepting a Margin for Error principle can be conservatively extended with Fragility.
Year	2022
Journal	Mind
Journal citation	131 (522), pp. 487-515
Publisher	Oxford University Press
ISSN	0026-4423
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)	https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzab040
Scopus EID	2-s2.0-85130172922
Page range	487-515
Publisher's version	License All rights reserved File Access Level Controlled
Output status	Published
Online	01 Oct 2021
Publication process dates
Deposited	16 May 2023

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