Triviality results for probabilistic modals

Journal article

Goldstein, Simon. (2019). Triviality results for probabilistic modals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 99(1), pp. 188-222.
AuthorsGoldstein, Simon

In recent years, a number of theorists have claimed that beliefs about probability are transparent. To believe probably p is simply to have a high credence that p. In this paper, I prove a variety of triviality results for theses like the above. I show that such claims are inconsistent with the thesis that probabilistic modal sentences have propositions or sets of worlds as their meaning. Then I consider the extent to which a dynamic semantics for probabilistic modals can capture theses connecting belief, certainty, credence, and probability. I show that although a dynamic semantics for probabilistic modals does allow one to validate such theses, it can only do so at a cost. I prove that such theses can only be valid if probabilistic modals do not satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus.

JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Journal citation99 (1), pp. 188-222
PublisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
Scopus EID2-s2.0-85068971299
Open accessPublished as green open access
Research or scholarlyResearch
Page range188-222
Research GroupDianoia Institute of Philosophy
Author's accepted manuscript
All rights reserved
File Access Level
Publisher's version
All rights reserved
File Access Level
Output statusPublished
Publication dates
Online12 Dec 2017
Place of publicationUnited States of America
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