Dianoia Institute of Philosophy
| Type | Department |
|---|---|
| Faculty | Faculty of Theology and Philosophy |
Latest research outputs
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#BelieveWomen and the ethics of belief
Bolinger, Renée Jorgensen. (2021). #BelieveWomen and the ethics of belief. In In Schwartzberg, Melissa and Kitcher, Philip (Ed.). Truth and evidence pp. 109-145 New York University Press.Book chapter
'Now' with subordinate clauses
Carter, Sam and Altshuler, Daniel. (2017). 'Now' with subordinate clauses. 27th Semantics and Linguistic Theory Conference. University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, United States of America 12 - 14 May 2017 Department of Linguistics, Cornell University. pp. 358-376 https://doi.org/10.3765/salt.v27i0.4162Conference paper
A bump on the road to presentism
Baron, Sam. (2015). A bump on the road to presentism. American Philosophical Quarterly. 52(4), pp. 345 - 356.Journal article
A Counterfactual Approach to Explanation in Mathematic
Baron, Sam, Colyvan, Mark and Ripley, David. (2020). A Counterfactual Approach to Explanation in Mathematic. Philosophia Mathematica. 28(1), pp. 1-34. https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkz023Journal article
A counterfactual approach to explanation in mathematics
Baron, Sam, Colyvan, Mark and Ripley, David. (2020). A counterfactual approach to explanation in mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica. 28(1), pp. 1-34. https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkz023Journal article
A cumulative case argument for infallibilism
Climenhaga, Nevin. (2021). A cumulative case argument for infallibilism. In In Kyriacou, Christos and Wallbridge, Kevin (Ed.). Skeptical invariantism reconsidered pp. 57-79 Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429353468-6Book chapter
A formal apology for metaphysics
Baron, Sam. (2018). A formal apology for metaphysics. Ergo. 5(39), pp. 1030-1060. https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.039Journal article
A model-invariant theory of causation
Gallow, J. Dmitri. (2021). A model-invariant theory of causation. The Philosophical Review. 130(1), pp. 45-96. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8699682Journal article
A new hope
Blumberg, Kyle and Hawthorne, John. (2022). A new hope. Journal of Philosophy. 119(1), pp. 5-32. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil202211911Journal article
A new problem for the linguistic doctrine of necessary truth
Russell, Gillian. (2010). A new problem for the linguistic doctrine of necessary truth. In In Wright, Cory D. and Pedersen, Nikolaj J. L. L. (Ed.). New waves in truth pp. 267-281 Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230296992_18Book chapter
A preface paradox for intention
Goldstein, Simon. (2016). A preface paradox for intention. Philosophers' Imprint. 16(14), pp. 1-20.Journal article
A problem for the ideal worlds account of desire
Blumberg, Kyle. (2022). A problem for the ideal worlds account of desire. Analysis. 82(1), pp. 7-15. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab036Journal article
A purely recombinatorial puzzle
Fritz, Peter. (2017). A purely recombinatorial puzzle. Noûs. 51(3), pp. 547 - 564. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12172Journal article
A question-sensitive theory of intention
Beddor, Bob and Goldstein, Simon. (2023). A question-sensitive theory of intention. The Philosophical Quarterly. 73(2), pp. 346-378. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqac031Journal article
A stronger doctrine of double effect
Bronner, Ben and Goldstein, Simon. (2018). A stronger doctrine of double effect. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 96(4), pp. 793 - 805. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2017.1400572Journal article
A subjectivist's guide to deterministic chance
Gallow, J. Dmitri. (2021). A subjectivist's guide to deterministic chance. Synthese. 198, pp. 4339-4372. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02346-yJournal article
A suppositional theory of conditionals
Carter, Sam. (2021). A suppositional theory of conditionals. Mind. 130(520), pp. 1059-1086. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaa071Journal article
A theory of conditional assertion
Goldstein, Simon. (2019). A theory of conditional assertion. Journal of Philosophy. 116(6), pp. 293-318. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2019116620Journal article
A theory of structural determination
Gallow, J. Dmitri. (2016). A theory of structural determination. Philosophical Studies. 173(1), pp. 159 - 186. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0474-5Journal article
A “good” explanation of Five Puzzles about Reasons
Finlay, Stephen. (2019). A “good” explanation of Five Puzzles about Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives. 33(1), pp. 62 - 104. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12126Journal article
Acting rightly : Three dimensions of moral conduct
Audi, Robert. (2021). Acting rightly : Three dimensions of moral conduct. Ratio. 34(1), pp. 56-67. https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12286Journal article
An introduction to the philosophy of time
Baron, Sam and Miller, Kristie. (2018). An introduction to the philosophy of time Polity Press.Book
Analyticity in externalist languages
Russell, Gillian. (2010). Analyticity in externalist languages. In In Sawyer, Sarah (Ed.). New waves in philosophy of language pp. 186-205 Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230248588_10Book chapter
Animal interrupted, or why accepting Pascal's Wager might be the last thing you ever do
Baron, Sam and Van Dyke, Christina. (2014). Animal interrupted, or why accepting Pascal's Wager might be the last thing you ever do. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. 52(S1), pp. 109 - 133. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12069Journal article
Are all reasons causes?
Dietz, Christina. (2016). Are all reasons causes? Philosophical Studies. 173(5), pp. 1179 - 1190. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0523-0Journal article
Are organizations’ religious exemptions democratically defensible?
Collins, Stephanie. (2020). Are organizations’ religious exemptions democratically defensible? Daedalus. 149(3), pp. 105-118. https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_01806Journal article
Are reasons normatively basic?
Audi, Robert. (2022). Are reasons normatively basic? Noûs. 56(3), pp. 639-653. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12377Journal article
Are there two free will problems? Compatibilism, incompatibilism, and moral responsibility [Esistono due problemi del libero arbitrio? Compatibilismo, incompaibilismo e responsabilità morale]
Audi, Robert. (2012). Are there two free will problems? Compatibilism, incompatibilism, and moral responsibility [Esistono due problemi del libero arbitrio? Compatibilismo, incompaibilismo e responsabilità morale]. Rivista di Filosofia. 113(2), pp. 329 - 334.Journal article
Attitude verbs’ local context
Blumberg, Kyle and Goldstein, Simon. (2023). Attitude verbs’ local context. Linguistics and Philosophy. 46(3), pp. 483-507. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-022-09373-yJournal article
Attitudes, presuppositions, and the binding theory
Blumberg, Kyle. (2023). Attitudes, presuppositions, and the binding theory. Journal of Semantics. pp. 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1093/jos/ffad007Journal article
Axiomatizability of propositionally quantified modal logics on relational frames
Fritz, Peter. (2022). Axiomatizability of propositionally quantified modal logics on relational frames. The Journal of Symbolic Logic. pp. 1-36. https://doi.org/10.1017/jsl.2022.79Journal article
Back to the unchanging past
Baron, Sam. (2017). Back to the unchanging past. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 98(1), pp. 129 - 147. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12127Journal article
Being in a position to know
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and Hawthorne, John. (2022). Being in a position to know. Philosophical Studies. 179, pp. 1323-1339. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01709-xJournal article
Being more realistic about reasons : On rationality and reasons perspectivism
Littlejohn, Clayton. (2019). Being more realistic about reasons : On rationality and reasons perspectivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 99(3), pp. 605-627. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12518Journal article
Being somehow without (possibly) being something
Fritz, Peter. (2023). Being somehow without (possibly) being something. Mind. 132(526), pp. 348-371. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac052Journal article
Belief is weak
Hawthorne, John, Rothschild, Daniel and Spectre, Levi. (2016). Belief is weak. Philosophical Studies. 173(5), pp. 1393 - 1404. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0553-7Journal article
Belief, faith, and acceptance
Audi, Robert. (2008). Belief, faith, and acceptance. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 63(1-3), pp. 87 - 102. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-007-9137-6Journal article
Belief: A study of form, content, and reference
Audi, Robert. (2013). Belief: A study of form, content, and reference. In In N. Nottelmann (Ed.). New essays on belief: Constitution, content, and structure pp. 30 - 54 Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137026521_3Book chapter
Believing epistemic contradictions
Beddor, Bob and Goldstein, Simon. (2018). Believing epistemic contradictions. The Review of Symbolic Logic. 11(1), pp. 87-114. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020316000514Journal article
Beyond individualism
Collins, Stephanie. (2019). Beyond individualism. In In Greaves, Hilary and Pummer, Theron (Ed.). Effective altruism: Philosophical issues pp. 202-217 Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198841364.003.0013Book chapter
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